Potential effects of mortgage and subsidy programs on housing affordability: the cases of Budapest and Moscow by Rogozhina, Natalia & Tumanov, Andrei et al
 1
 
 
 
Potential effects of mortgage and 
subsidy programs on housing 
affordability: the cases of 
Budapest and Moscow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2004 
 
 
 
Improvement of Economic Policy 
Through Think Tank Partnerships  
 
 
 2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The publication was supported by U.S. Agency for International Development  through Think 
Tank Partnership Project. 
(Contract #PCE-I-00-00-00014-00, Task Order #803 Improvement of Economic Policy Through Think Tank Partnership Project) 
 
The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed herein are those of the 
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. 
 
Natalia Rogozhina, Andrei Tumanov 
Institute of Urban Economics, 
Moscow 
József Hegedüs, Eszter Somogyi
Metropolitan Research Institute 
Budapest 
Raymond Struyk 
Urban Institute, Washington 
 3
Contents 
1 INTRODUCTION: HOUSING AS A PUBLIC POLICY ISSUE 4 
2 HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 6 
2.1 DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENTS OF HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 6 
2.2 AFFORDABILITY I: HOUSING COST TO INCOME RATIO 6 
2.3 AFFORDABILITY II: PURCHASING CAPACITY OF THE HOUSEHOLDS 7 
2.3.1 HOUSE PRICE INCOME RATIO 8 
2.3.2 HOUSING AFFORDABILITY INDEX (HAI) 8 
2.3.3 HOUSING OPPORTUNITY INDEX (HOI) 9 
2.4 PROBLEM OF „CASH BASED” HOUSING FINANCE 10 
3 HOUSING MARKET IN BUDAPEST AND MOSCOW 11 
3.1 HOUSING STOCK, POPULATION 11 
3.2 HOUSE PRICE, INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY INDEXES 14 
3.3 INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 17 
3.3.1 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 17 
3.3.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF RESIDENTIAL HOUSING LENDING SYSTEM IN RUSSIA 18 
3.3.3 THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF RESIDENTIAL HOUSING LENDING SYSTEM IN HUNGARY 19 
4 EFFECTS OF MORTGAGE AND SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 21 
4.1 THE MODEL 21 
4.2 TRADE-UP OPTION 24 
4.3 THE FIRST TIME BUYER OPTION 26 
4.4 ISSUE OF UNEQUAL ACCESS TO MORTGAGE 28 
5 AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS 29 
5.1 TRADE-UP OPTION 31 
5.2 FIRST TIME BUYER OPTIONS 34 
6 EFFECTS OF THE SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 37 
7 CONCLUSION: HOUSING POLICY RECOMMENDATION 41 
8 BIBLIOGRAPHY 42 
 
 
 
 4
Introduction: housing as a public policy issue 
Transition from the centrally planned economy towards the market economy has taken much 
longer than most observers had thought. Housing, and especially housing finance, proved to be a 
very complex area (Struyk, 1996; Hegedüs, Mayo, Tosics, 1997; Struyk, 2001). There were 
several differences in housing finance among the socialist countries; Hungary and Russia 
represented the two extremes. In Russia the state ownership in urban areas dominated the housing 
market, while in Hungary owner occupation was in the majority even in urban areas. Concerning 
finance, the credit sector played a marginal role in Russia, but in Hungary (especially in the 80s) 
it became an important source of housing finance. The differences between Hungary and Russia 
were larger in terms of the typical housing indicators (tenure, housing finance, etc.) than between 
Hungary and any developed European countries. However, the “logic” of the operation of the 
housing systems in the socialist countries was similar, namely the state institutions dominated the 
processes (investment, allocation, credits etc.) in the sector. Even if countries in the region are in 
a very different situation today, following World War II they shared a common period of socialist 
housing systems up until the beginning of the 1990s. This fact justified using the term “East-
European Housing Model” (Hegedüs-Tosics, 1996) as the origin of the present system.   
In the pre-transition period, the typical financial institutions (if they existed at that time) were 
part of the state economy. Their “behaviour” was closer to state organizations (allocating 
subsidies and resources) than to market institutions. Typically, state owned banks were 
responsible for extending housing loans with very long maturities, low fixed interest rate 
regulated the size of the loan, and there were no underwriting procedures. Loans were more a 
type of subsidy than an actual loan; real estate developers were more a part of the state planning 
process rather than the real estate market. 
In the 90s several changes took place with respect to the legal and institutional framework of the 
housing sector and housing finance system in the region. However, in the 90s housing did not 
play a “leading role” in the economies of the region, and even its social and political importance 
decreased. Housing finance even lost its scope in countries where it had been relatively 
significant (e.g. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic). There is currently a discussion in the 
literature concerning what the main factors are explaining the slow recovery of the housing 
sector. There are several factors that have to be considered as possible explanations: 
Lack of an efficient legal framework  
Lack of the political will to enforce laws 
Slow institutional changes, especially the role of the state in terms of the direct and 
indirect subsidies 
Household behavior to accept the terms of market transactions 
Macroeconomic conditions. 
Housing finance has been one of the key target areas in the technical assistance programs of the 
Donor Agencies, because – it was thought – that a gap between house prices and income should 
be bridged by an efficient market, based on a loan sector and not by subsidies.  Actually, we 
learnt from past experiences that it can be bridged just for a “segment” of society, and the others 
are either without access to owner-occupied housing (in the absence of inheritance) or are forced 
to go to the market rental sector. Thus, “across the board” housing subsikdies are not a solution, 
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partly because the budgetary costs are unaffordable, and partly because without mean testing it 
will have a regressive income effect.   
As part of the transition, the legal framework had been put more or less into place by the middle 
of the 90s, and new institutions had been established. However, housing finance had started very 
slowly, and until the end of the 90s virtually nothing had happened. (In Russia, the financial crisis 
of 1998 caused a halt in the incipient process.)  What are the reasons for this?  
The problem of transitional countries lies in the separation of the housing sector from the 
economy. The countries in transition could not use the potential economic advantages of the 
housing sector. The housing sector might contribute to the macroeconomic recovery, but at the 
same time, without macroeconomic stability, no efficient housing system could be built. 
New legal foundations and new housing finance institutions cannot be built up in an environment 
where the housing equities are insecure, in a situation where legal and enforcement procedures do 
not function, and the process of economic deterioration or uncertainty is not localized. A strategy 
for building up a new, market-based housing finance system should include the financial 
management issue of the stock as well. In housing finance, the financial agent has a long-term 
commitment on both the demand and supply side, which depends very much on the long-term 
stability of the economy, along with its steady, uninterrupted development. Thus the reform in 
housing finance should parallel other reforms in the economy, and real changes can only be 
expected with stabilization. 
Housing finance -- that is, the financial issues of the housing sector -- relates both to the stock of 
housing and to incremental investment (both in new construction and in transactions). A housing 
policy, which segregates the new housing construction from operation and maintenance, is very 
ineffective as it lacks the basic understanding of the real estate economy. The importance of this 
statement is underscored by the fact that in most transitional countries the sector is in “deficit”. 
The operation of the sector is not, and could not be, financed by the household sector; and state 
subsidy contributions are not enough for the “reproduction” of the stock. Households do not pay 
their bills for housing services; and the state subsidies are decreasing as well, which leads to a 
steady deterioration process.  
The institutional and management structure of the housing stock has an important effect on the 
speed of transition. Service providers in the housing sector remained mostly within the public 
sector, although different outsourcing methods have been introduced. The restructuring of the 
old-fashioned maintenance companies in urban areas is an important task of the housing sector 
reform. 
To understand housing finance issues in the region, it is very important to see the potential range 
of the mortgage sector on housing affordability. The Institute of Urban Economics, Metropolitan 
Research Institute and the Urban Institute on the basis of their earlier cooperation proposed to 
study the effects of different mortgage products on the housing and credit demands and on 
affordability. The proposal was approved and supported by USAID.  
The results of the comparative research have three parts: 1. Results related to Moscow; 2. Results 
relevant for Hungary; and 3. a comparative analysis of Budapest and Moscow.  
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This paper reports the third part of the results, the comparative analysis of the effects of mortgage 
characteristics and subsidy programs on housing affordability. The first section of the paper 
overviews the literature on affordability issues and summarizes the problems of the “cash based 
housing finance” system. The second part gives a background to understanding housing markets 
in Budapest and Moscow. The third part covers the analysis of the mortgage and affordability 
model in three steps:  (1) the potential loan capacity, (2) affordability based on target prices, and 
(3) the effect of the subsidy program on affordability and equity. The fourth part draws some 
policy conclusions. 
 
Housing affordability  
1.1 Definition and measurements of housing affordability  
Housing affordability1 can be defined as the ability of a household to pay the costs of housing, 
without imposing constraints on living costs. This definition has three critical factors:  
1. What is the level of housing, that is adequate for a given household? We have to define the 
adequate housing consumption (housing standards). 
2. What is the minimum income for a given household to live (living standards)? 
3. What is the “price” of housing to provide a sustainable operation (cost standards)? 
There are two approaches to the affordability issue. One is related to paying for existing housing, 
where we suppose that the level of housing consumption is adequate; the second is related to the 
access to housing in a situation when the household’s present housing condition is not adequate.  
1.2 Affordability I: Housing cost to income ratio 
The typical (and simple) approach to housing affordability is to define a threshold percentage of 
the household income that is the maximum a household “should” dedicate to housing costs. 
Housing is unaffordable if a household spends more than that percentage of its income. The 
rationale behind this approach is that affordable housing is an important factor in the well being 
of individuals and families. High housing costs relative to income are often associated with 
severe financial difficulty, especially among low income households, and can leave such 
households with insufficient income to meet other basic needs such as food, clothing, transport, 
medical care and education. 
                                                 
1 See Hancock (1991), Howenstine (1993); Malpass (1993); Hulchanski (1995) Bourassa (1996) AIHW (1997), 
www.nahb.org (National Association of Home Builders) 
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This indicator compares current housing expenditures with households’ income. It can be 
measured for both renters and owner-occupiers. In countries with a large private rental sector the 
rent to income indicator is used, in countries with a low private rental sector the housing costs 
include user charges. The key question is how the expenditures are defined. There have been two 
main approaches to measuring housing affordability: (1) a proportional measure, wherein 
affordable housing costs are set as a fixed proportion of income and (2) a residual measure, 
wherein affordable housing costs are set as a fixed amount that does not vary with income level. 
The proportional measures are more generally used because of their simplicity. 
The New Zealand Social Reports, for example, use the ratio of a household spending more than 
30 per cent of its income on housing as a key indicator. There, 24 percent were in this group in 
2001. In the lowest fifth of the household income distribution, 42 % spent more than 30 per cent 
of their income on housing. 
The Australian National Housing Strategy (NHS) defined housing affordability as “an income to 
meet other basic needs such as food, clothing, transport, medical care and education” (NHS, 
1991). Households paying more than 25 to 30 percent of their incomes in rent or mortgage 
payments were considered to be experiencing affordability problems. The NHS defined 
households in the lowest 40 percent of the income range who pay more than 25 percent of income 
in housing costs as being in ‘housing stress’. This benchmark — and the more conservative 
benchmark of 30 percent — has subsequently been widely used as an overall measure of housing 
related hardship in Australia (AIHW 1997). 
In the USA, the National Low-Income Housing Coalition (October 2000) ranks states in terms of 
the hourly wage needed in a 40 hour week to be able to afford a 2 bedroom apartment at fair 
market rent, where affordability is defined by HUD in terms of paying no more than 30 percent 
of household income on housing costs. 
1.3 Affordability II: purchasing capacity of the households 
The TTPP project focuses on affordability related to the access to housing and examines the 
relationship between affordability and mortgage products. Purchase affordability (accessibility) 
of housing is determined by factors including the price of housing, the financial resources of 
prospective purchasers, conditions pertaining to the granting of mortgages (e.g. the housing 
interest rate and the amount borrowed) and the relationship between these factors. Housing 
affordability indexes differ in how they measure the relationship of these factors. 
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1.3.1 House price income ratio 
There are several ways to measure home purchase affordability, each with its advantages and 
disadvantages. The simplest measure compares a specific income level, usually median income to 
a specific house price, usually the median sales price. The advantage of comparing only two data 
points is that the data is more likely to be available and the concept is straightforward. The 
disadvantage is that the comparison hides the complexity of the housing market and may not 
reveal the true picture.  
In the UN Human Settlements Program (Habitat) the housing price 
to income ratio is defined as the ratio of the median free-market 
price of a dwelling unit and the median annual household income.2 
This indicator is a key measure of housing affordability, providing 
information on the overall performance of housing markets and 
important insights into several housing market dysfunctions, 
indicative of a variety of policy failures.  
1.3.2 Housing affordability index (HAI) 
There are other affordability indicators, which compare the household income to the house prices. 
One solution used in several countries (for example, in Australia by the Housing Industry 
Association and Commonwealth Bank, or by The National Association of Realtors in USA) is the 
housing affordability index (HAI). This index, comparing a representative income to a 
representative house price, calculates affordability based on mortgage qualification rules. Two 
versions are possible. (1) Affordability is measured by the relationship between the income 
needed to afford a representative house and a representative income. The higher the percentage 
is, the greater the housing affordability is. (2) The second approach compares the house price that 
a target income can afford with a target house price. The greater the percentage is, the more 
affordable the market is. 
Australian Housing Affordability is measured by the ratio of average household disposable 
income to the (“qualifying”) income required to meet payments on a typical dwelling (expressed 
as an index). In calculating qualifying income a deposit of 20 percent with repayments equivalent 
to 30 percent of income is assumed using a conventional 25-year loan. Income measures are 
based on national account estimates of household disposable income. An increase in the index 
represents an improvement in affordability, and a decline in the index a decrease in affordability. 
A value less than 100 indicates that a household with an average annual income would have less 
than the income required to service an average mortgage. The median dwelling price has been 
obtained from a census of dwellings financed by Commonwealth Bank loan approvals. An 
estimate of the median price of established dwellings of first homebuyers is used in the 
Affordability Index. The HAI was 170 in 2001 (September) and decreased to 137 by 2002 
(September).3 
                                                 
2 This indicator is one of ten "key" housing indicators approved by the Commission on Human Settlements 
(Resolution 14/13), 
3 Source: Commonwealth Bank Housing Report September QTR 2002 
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The National Association of Realtors (NAR) measures the ability of the median income family 
(or first time homebuyer) to qualify for a mortgage on the median priced home (or a starter 
home).  It measures whether or not a typical family could qualify for a mortgage loan on a typical 
home. A typical home is defined as the national median-priced, existing single-family home as 
calculated by NAR. The typical family is defined as one earning the median family income as 
reported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The prevailing mortgage interest rate is the effective 
rate on loans closed on existing homes from the Federal Housing Finance Board and HSH 
Associates, Butler, N.J. These components are used to determine if the median income family can 
qualify for a mortgage on a typical home. To interpret the indices, a value of 100 means that a 
family with the median income has exactly enough income to qualify for a mortgage on a 
median-priced home. An index above 100 signifies that family earning the median income has 
more than enough income to qualify for a mortgage loan on a median-priced home, assuming a 
20% down payment, with the monthly P&I payment not exceeding 25 percent of the median 
family monthly income. For example, a composite HAI of 120.0 means a family earning the 
median family income has 120 percent of the income necessary to qualify for a conventional loan 
covering 80 percent of a median-priced existing single-family home. An increase in the HAI, 
then, shows that this family is more able to afford the median priced home.  
1.3.3 Housing Opportunity Index (HOI)4 
The Housing Opportunity Index (HOI) measures the share of homes within a specific market that 
a typical household (family earning the median income) can afford to buy. In the United States, 
this index is calculated quarterly by the National Association of Home Builders and it compares 
the median income in a locality with the median home price.  Housing Opportunity Index is 
based on the median family income, interest rates, and the price distributions of homes sold in 
180 metro markets in a particular quarter of a year. The price of homes sold is collected from 
actual court records by First American Real Estate Solutions, a marketing company. The median 
family income for each market is calculated by the Department of Housing and Urban 
development (HUD).  
An HOI of 70 percent means that families in a region earning the median household income 
could afford to buy 70 percent of homes sold in the region. This technique requires a distribution 
of all house prices and median income of the target household (e.g. first time home buyers, all 
households, certain occupations). NAHB purchased such a data set, which shows the prices of all 
homes that have changed hands in a particular market. Because the address is given, the data can 
also be segmented into metropolitan areas and further into central city and suburbs. In 2001 (4Q) 
the HOI was 64,1 for the USA, and ranged from 76,1 for Springfield, MA to 8,0 for the San 
Francisco Bay Area, CA. 5 
                                                 
4 See www.nahb.org 
5 Source: National Association of Homebuilders 
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1.4 Problem of „cash based” housing finance 
After more than 10 years of transition, in countries of the region housing finance had been very 
undeveloped. The housing sector practically operated without long-term credit. This is a problem, 
because the lack of long-term loans makes housing unaffordable for the majority of households; 
this in turn puts strong pressure on the government for subsidies. Moreover,  most subsidies can 
easily create disincentives for financial institutions to offer loans and for households to take loans 
at market interest rates. Without long-term housing finance, residential mobility is lower than it 
could be, which may impede economic restructuring; and households’ adjustment in their 
housing consumption is more rigid, leaving room for distortions (like increased preferences for 
cars and other durable goods whose financial constraints are less important).   
There are different explanations for the low level of borrowing, factors both on the bank side and 
on the consumer side. (See Struyk, 2001, Dimond, 1999; Hegedüs-Várhegyi, 2000) Affordability 
has become the key term in housing policy in both developed and transition countries. In 
transition countries, the puzzle is that high P/I ratio is accompanied with low level of housing 
cost/income ratio, which means that most of the transactions are based on cash transfers both 
intergeneration (inheritance) and intrageneration (family help).  
In the pre-transition housing system, the key problem was the housing shortage. The housing of 
shortage led to a “dual housing system”, which had two spheres: (1) state sphere and (2) private, 
where even the private sphere were under state control. However, the private sphere was based 
typically on “cash finance”. It was exceptional in the region that subsidized long-term loans were 
available for transaction in the private sphere. After the transition the housing shortage has been 
replaced by the shortage of affordable housing, because the directly state controlled sphere 
diminished, and the private sector became dominant but without long-term finance.  
Housing cost to income ration was low before the transition, typically 5-10 % of the net income, 
while in the developed countries it is around 25-30 % of the income. After the transition the 
housing cost to income ratio increased but it is far from the level of developed countries. Some 
observers conclude from this fact that households in the region are reluctant to pay higher share 
of their income to housing. Without efficient housing allowances it is very difficult to increase 
the housing cost to income ratio in these countries, because the higher burden on households lead 
to a “mass-arrears” situation, which is politically difficult to manage. The problem was that the 
income distribution became more unequal, and the lower income groups were not able to keep up 
with higher housing costs.  
The fact is that households which move on the market typically pay a much higher share of their 
income formally or informally. Because of the lack of long-term loans, typically they have to use 
savings of the family to finance their homes, and this could involve a substantial informal 
housing cost. The other evidence that proves the “reluctance thesis” wrong is the high rent to 
income ratio in the private rental sector. To conclude, the lack of long-term credit explains the 
low level of housing cost to income ratio, and probably the so called reluctance of the households 
to spend on housing is an incorrect explanation of the low level of housing loans. The other fact 
that supports this argument is the high level of “car loans”: households are willing to take loans 
for cars. 
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Housing market in Budapest and Moscow6 
1.5 Housing stock, population 
Moscow has a population of 8,5 million, which stabilized after 1995. Budapest’s population is 
2,5 million, but ithas decreased slightly in the last ten years because of a fast suburbanization 
process taking place. The population in the agglomeration increased by 100 thousand and the 
population of the city decreased by 200 thousand inhabitants.  
Housing investment has declined in transition countries during the 90s, with output typically 
plummeting to the 30-50 percent of the 80s level. Behind this trend, huge regional differences can 
be traced, for example, the housing output in Moscow has not decreased as much, and even by 
2001 it had reached the level of 1985.  
 
Table 1 Demography and construction between 1985 and 2001, Moscow 
Moscow  1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Population 
(thousand 
inhabitants) 
8 652 8 911 8 572 8 547 8 537 8 538 8 537 8 546 8 539 8 533 8 549 
New construction 
(n of units) 52 982 38 863 40 684 44 193 44 481 43 707 44 444 49 233 52 239 57 560 62 604 
New construction 
per thousand 
inhabitants 
6,1 4,4 4,7 5,2 5,2 5,1 5,2 5,8 6,1 6,7 7,3 
 
In Moscow the housing investments did not follow the business cycle and remained quite stable 
in the second half of the 90s, while in Hungary construction in the Budapest agglomeration 
slowed down. Because of the suburbanization, the settlements around the capital grew much 
faster.  But on average the level of housing investment  (measured by the number of new units 
per 1000 inhabitants) in Moscow is almost twice as high as in Budapest. The other important 
difference is that in Budapest there is a cycle in investment, which is more of a “political” than 
business cycle: variations in construction were in responseto the changes in the subsidy system 
rather than to changes in the economic environment.  
                                                 
6 Moscow covers the area inside the border of the city of Moscow. Budapest includes the city of Budapest and its 78 
neighbour settlements. The basis of comparison is the two surveys conducted in 2002 in Moscow, and 2003 in 
Budapest (Hungary). The Moscow survey had a sample size of 1,380; the Budapest survey had a sample size of 
2,148 as a sub-sample of the national housing survey. Housing income data for Moscow is an inputes data, for 
Budapest it was corrected. The house price data for Moscow were inputed based on real estate surveys, in Budapest 
respondents’ estimates were corrected through hedonic price fuction. Savings data were in both countries imputed 
using macroeconomic data, and a distribution function.  
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Table 2 Housing construction and population in Budapest 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Housing Construction (new units per 1000 inhabitants) 
City of Budapest 2,4 1,9 1,8 1,5 1,7 1,6 1,7 1,6 1,6 1,7 2,4 
Agglomeration 5,4 4,2 4,2 4,8 5,4 5,8 5,5 5,0 4,6 5,3 6,6 
Budapest, total 3,0 2,4 2,3 2,2 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,4 2,3 2,7 3,5 
Population (thousand inhabitants 
City of Budapest 2 018 2 016 2 009 1 996 1 930 1 907 1 886 1 861 1 839 1 812 n.a. 
Agglomeration 554 558 564 571 589 599 608 618 629 641 n.a. 
Budapest, total 2 572 2 574 2 572 2 567 2 519 2 506 2 494 2 480 2 467 2 452 n.a. 
 
Housing remained much more subsidized in Moscow than in Budapest. As consequences of the 
almost “give away” privatization in Budapest, only 9 percent of the housing stock remained 
public (owned by local governments), while in Moscow 30 percent of the stock is still in public 
hands. This difference is much more a consequence of the design of privatization than an 
intentional difference in housing policy. In Moscow’s large municipal rental sector (as well as 
most multifamily owner-occupied units), maintenance and operation is subsidized and full 
property rights are tied to legal occupancy, which means that there is no real incentive to “buy” 
the unit even if it is available essentially free of charge. Hungarian analyses showed that one of 
the motives for buying the unit by sitting tenants was the “fear” that rents would uncontrollably 
increase in the future. In Moscow, the population does not feel this uncertainty.   In Budapest, the 
property right to “sell” the rental tenure is limited. This shows that the legal regulations of 
transition were not able to get rid of the socialist model radically. But in Moscow the tenants of 
municipal units enjoy full property right--they can will the unit to another occupant and can 
privatize and sell the unit at any time.  This has effects on the mortgage system as well.  
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Figure 1 Composition of the housing stock 
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The housing stock in Budapest seems to be better in terms of size. Both the number of rooms and 
the floor space of the apartments are higher in Budapest than in Moscow. This is partly the 
consequence of the 80s when Hungary moved toward private, individual housing construction, 
while in Moscow, even in the 90s, the average size of the new units, was between 62-70 sq m (in 
Budapest around 100 sq m). In considering the age composition of the stock, it is important to 
realize that the units built at the turn of the last century are an important part of Budapest’s stock. 
The Budapest housing stock is older than Moscow’s, where 87 percent of the stock was built 
between 1960 and 1990. 
The average household size is larger in Moscow and the families represent a younger structure.  
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Figure 2 Household size and age of the head of the household in Budapest and Moscow 
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1.6 House price, income and affordability indexes 
Affordability depends on the housing price, household income, and the terms and availability of 
mortgage finance. In Moscow the average household income is 30 percent higher than in 
Budapest. However, in the first three income-quintiles the average household income is 30 
percent higher in Budapest than for the same group in Moscow. But in the fourth income-quintile 
the income in Moscow is 33 percent higher, and in the fifth income quintile it is higher by 133 
percent.   (See Figure 3.) 
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 Figure 3 Income distribution  
Cumulative income distribution (USD/month)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Budapest
Moscow
 
Income distribution (USD/month)
478 550 668
855
1073
712
211 346
590
1222
2889
1052
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 group average
Budapest
Moscow
 
 
Not only the income level, but also the income distribution has an effect on housing affordability. 
Regarding house prices we found that they are higher in Budapest than in Moscow, as shown in 
Figure 4.   
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Figure 4 House prices in Budapest and Moscow 
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these difficulties and use a measure affordability, which takes into consideration the distribution 
pattern of the house prices and income. 
Table 3 Affordability index in Budapest and Moscow, 2003 (measured with medium values 
and with average values) 
Indexes based on average 
values 
Indexes based on 
medium values Comparison 
Budapest Moscow Budapest Moscow USA 
House Price/Income ratio 7,7 3,2 6,6 5,8 2,8 
Housing Affordability Index 57% 77% 67% 42% 136% 
Housing Opportunity Index 17% 15% 11% 4% 65% 
 
Methodological points notwithstanding, the conclusion is that affordability is a very serious 
problem both in Budapest and Moscow according to each index.  
 
1.7 Institutional environment 
1.7.1 Institutional Background 
During the nineties because of the lack of affordable long term housing loans, housing 
transactions became cash based both in Hungary and in Russia. The main reasons for the 
undeveloped housing finance system was the economic crises that both countries went through, 
high inflation, deficiencies in the institutional and legal systems, and the lack of effective demand 
on the side of households.  
By the turn of the century, positive changes happened that created a much more favorable 
environment for residential housing lending. With the improvement of the economy, the 
households` income situation stabilized more or less, which enabled them (at least a part of them) 
to make longer term financial commitments. Inflation, and hence the interest rates on loans, 
decreased substantially, thereby decreasing the interest rate risk to banks of fixed-rate long term 
housing loans. The institutional changes included development of the market based bank system, 
legal changes required for the establishment and operation of new financial institution.  
However, in Russia the development of housing finance system was significantly held back by 
the financial crisis of 1998. As a result of this crisis many big banks, especially those that 
operated in metropolises stopped lending for a period and continued their practice of originating 
hard currency loans when they resumed lending. Simultaneously, consumers lost their trust in 
banks, which meant that they were reluctant to keep their savings in bank deposits. On the banks` 
side, this behavior of households just enhanced the problem of the lack of stable liabilities. The 
lack of long-term resources was also relevant in the case of Hungarian mortgage lending system 
as well; because of higher yields on other investments, households preferred to keep their savings 
in  forms other than bank deposits. 
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To solve the problem of the lack of the long-term resources, both countries’ policies concentrated 
on drawing in funds from investors through new instruments, such as mortgage bond emissions 
and secondary market activities. Despite the broad similarities, the present scale of mortgage 
lending differs in the two countries significantly. In Russia only few thousand residential 
mortgage loans were issued during the past 2-3 years, while in Hungary the present stock of loans 
is almost 300 thousand and its value equals 7 percent of GDP. Such a big difference in the scale 
of housing lending in the two countries can be explained in part by the different subsidy systems. 
During the last four years Hungary gradually has  implemented a deep interest rate subsidy for 
housing loans (resulting in very low interest rates), while in Russia only modest subsidies are 
given to mortgage lending. 
 
1.7.2 The institutional structure of residential housing lending system in Russia 
The primary operators of the emerging mortgage lending market are 
• Universal commercial banks 
• Federal Housing Mortgage Lending Agency 
• Regional mortgage agencies 
 
In addition, there are certain organizations, whose activities are aimed at improving the living 
conditions of citizens by applying various non-bank financial schemes: housing funds, 
construction savings banks, cooperative societies, share participation in construction financing, 
etc. Due to the insignificant scale of housing mortgage lending, these organizations are 
dominating the market at this time.  
Before the crisis of August 1998, only about 20 Russian banks offered housing mortgage loans to 
the population. After the crisis, as noted, a number of banks suspended their activities;   as the 
economic situation became more stable, they were replaced by new banks, which gradually 
started to mortgage lending operations.  
According to available data, in 2002 mortgage lending services were provided by 149 credit 
organizations (11.2 percent of the total number of registered ones). At the same time, mortgage 
loans accounted only for 0.5 percent of the total volume of loans granted to the population. 
Consequently, long-term mortgage lending is still not a separate line of business for Russian 
commercial banks. The banks face several problems in the case of mortgage lendingthat hold 
backexpansion of lending activity in housing finance. Credit risk is still one of the main problem 
that banks experience because of the legal and judicial difficulties of foreclosure, and problems 
with the eviction and sale of mortgaged property of mortgagors in default . Furthermore, interest 
rate risk is significant as well. Given the lack of confidence in the Russian economic stability, the 
banks, particularly those in the main mortgage markets of Moscow and St. Petersburg, still prefer 
to issue mortgage loans in hard currency, although this kind of loan are not affordable by the 
majority of the society. Banks still generally view housing mortgage lending to population or 
construction loans to developers as highly risky and not profitable enough. As a result, mortgage 
lending in Russia is being developed mostly through budget schemes and is highly dependent on 
the support of regional administrations.  
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Regarding the development of housing mortgage lending system, a significant step was the 
establishment of the Housing Mortgage Lending Agency (HMLA) by the state. The Agency 
was founded as open joint stock company with controlling interest held by the state. HMLA 
played an important role in developing standards and requirements for issuing and servicing long-
term mortgage loans in order to minimize the risks and improve the reliability of the system. In 
2002, the HMLA started working more actively. A new version of unified mortgage lending 
standards was prepared, and the Agency started to work with regional operators of the mortgage 
lending market on the issues of mortgage loan refinancing. The HMLA has concluded 
agreements with 51 regions, and 11 regions have already undertaken to sell mortgages to HMLA. 
The HMLA also plans to implement mortgage lending programs in cooperation with large banks. 
The HMLA willwill attract funds through the emission of mortgage securities, although to date it 
sold only non collateralized debt. Its bonds are secured by the state guarantees of the Russian 
Federation. The Agency plans to refinance mortgage loans pools, bought mainly from regional 
mortgage operators. 
At the same time, many Russian regions are developing and implementing their own housing 
programs. For this purpose, regional mortgage lending agencies and housing funds are being 
established. Under these programs, certain funds from regional and local budgets are allocated for 
issuing loans to citizens for purchase or construction of housing. Budget funds are allocated in 
two different ways. The more common form until recently was subsidizing of the interest rate on 
mortgage loans issued by authorized banks. Another way is issuing loans for housing purposes at 
rates lower than those on the loan market. In the latter case, there is a special management body 
that organizes the issuance of preferential housing loans through an authorized bank or agent 
bank. Further development of mortgage lending programs in regions is associated with 
establishment of the market system of mortgage lending and a secondary mortgage market. 
1.7.3 The institutional structure of residential housing lending system in Hungary     
In Hungary the main institutional and legal changes were implemented by the end of the nineties 
that made possible a more extended, long-term mortgage lending activity. As a result of the 
institutional development of the nineties, three main types of financial institutions participate in 
housing finance:  
commercial banks,  
mortgage banks and  
contract savings banks.  
 
The mortgage lending activity started to grow significantly when the new housing loan subsidy 
system was introduced that gave interest rate subsidy to housing loans. The idea was to establish 
an interest rate subsidy that makes mortgage loans more available for households during the 
period until the inflation decreases to a level that allows for acceptable conditions for long-term 
mortgages. Therefore, the subsidy scheme was designed so that the subsidy declines in parallel 
with the fall of inflation. Two different types of interest rate subsidies were introduced: (a) an 
interest rate subsidy to mortgage bonds and (b) the interest rate subsidy for loans connected to 
new construction. The program was launched in January,  2000, and the mortgage bonds have 
become the primary resource for mortgage loans due to their subsidization.  
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Until the late 1990s, the housing lending market was highly concentrated and dominated by OTP, 
the former state bank, and only from 1996 have other commercial banks started to enter to the 
housing finance market. While in the case of retail lending the monopoly of OTP has shrunk 
substantially, in the area of housing loans OTP’s share declined very little: as late as in 1997 OTP 
still had nearly 90% of the market. Due to reasons mentioned earlier – low demand, high inflation 
rates, high credit risk – commercial banks moved in the housing lending market only later and 
with a very cautious business strategy. They were mostly following OTP’s policy as a result of 
which there was no genuine competition between banks. The lack of competition was also felt in 
the slow decrease of real interest rates in housing loans. Owing to the new subsidy policy 
introduced in 2000, the number of commercial banks and financial institutions on the housing 
lending market has considerably grown in the past three years. According to Hungarian Central 
Statistics Office (HCSO) data: 16 commercial banks, 3 mortgage banks and 179 savings 
cooperatives operated in the market in 2002 as a result of which the market now is less 
concentrated.  
Setting up mortgage banks became possible with the enactment of Act 1997/XXX on Mortgage 
Credit Institutions and Mortgage Bonds. Currently there are three mortgage banks in the market: 
the Land and Mortgage Bank (FHB), the HypoVereinsbank (HVB, owned by the Germans 
(1999)), and the OTP Mortgage Bank (2001).  
The first mortgage bank, the state-owned FHB was set up in 1998.  At the outset, housing lending 
was not central in the bank’s strategy: the bank primarily targeted the upper segment of the 
market and did not deal with subsidized loans, which it considered not safe enough. Initially, with 
the introduction of the new subsidy program FHB gained a central role in housing finance--at the 
beginning only the FHB was entitled to receive the subsidy for mortgage bond issuance. Because 
the FHB was not authorized to issue its own loans, loan origination was organized in cooperation 
with commercial banks and saving cooperatives in the form of refinancing agreements or on a 
commission basis. The reason for such arrangement was to break OTP’s, the former state bank’s, 
monopoly in the market. However, later FHB’s monopoly on subsidized bonds was cut back, and 
other mortgage banks gained the right to emit subsidized mortgage bonds.  ButFHB was themn 
permitted to issue its own mortgages as well. As a result of these changes, OTP established its 
own mortgage bank. The current pattern of mortgage lending is that recently the FHB has 
refinancing agreements with nine commercial banks and issues its own loans through its five 
branches, while the OTP Mortgage Bank does not issue its own loans but has an exclusive 
refinancing agreement with OTP commercial bank. With the current arrangement OTP has 
regained its leading role in mortgage lending, two-third of the mortgage loans was issued by the 
OTP in 2002.  
Although 8 percent of the households have saving contracts with the contract savings banks, 
these financial institutions have marginal role in housing lending. The main reason is that the 
conditions of their loans became less favorable with the introduction of new interest rate subsidy 
system. However, the contract saving banks enjoy high subsidies on the saving side. 
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Effects of mortgage and subsidy programs 
1.8 The model 
The model used to estimate the loan and housing demand capacity is based on household surveys. 
In the first block, using the household’s characteristics (income, savings, house price, age, family 
size etc.) and the mortgage product characteristics, we estimate the maximum capacity for loans 
and for housing purchase on the two markets (Block 1 in Figure 5).  We studied the effects of the 
mortgage product characteristic, on the potential demand for two groups of households in 
different housing circumstances: trade-up and “first time buyer” (fully defined below). The 
effective mortgage demand depends on the target prices and behavioral “rules” for the individual 
households (e.g. what is the price of the housing unit a given household wants to buy, and on 
what conditions the household will decide to move). Based on housing market information, we 
defined target unit prices and introduced some simple behavioral rules. For example, households 
will move if they can buy a unit whose value is a minimum of 25 percent higher than the value of 
the existing unit. Using this information we analyzed the housing affordability of the different 
households (Block 2).  
 
The next question we raised was the possible effects of different subsidy programs. We examined 
three subsidy programs to define the effects on the total demand (effectiveness) and on the 
affordability of the different income groups (Block 3).  
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When estimating the maximum loan and housing demand capacity, we started from a standard 
model and examined how the changes in loan terms affect the demand. 
We focused on the comparison of the two markets and did calculations for two scenarios:  
1. We assumed that every household who owns its apartment could trade up7. We call it a 
“trade-up” option. The emphasis here is on the direction and relative size of the effects 
caused by the changes in loan terms.  
2. We assumed that where there is no possibility to sell the apartment, or no trade up, every 
household has to move into a new dwelling without the possibility of selling the existing 
housing unit. This is the „first time buyer” option. 
The housing demand is a function of loan capacity (that in turn depends basically on income), 
savings and house price. Thus the difference between the two options is the price of the existing 
unit. In the first case the accumulated value of the existing unit can be used as „savings” in the 
„underwriting” process, thus the loan capacity should be much higher than in the first time buyer 
option. 
 
Table 4 The standard loan product used in model and the actual typical loan product’s 
parameters in Budapest and Moscow 
Characteristic Unit Model In Hungary In Russia
Interest rate % per year 15 9 12-15 
Loan term years 15 15 10-15 
Limitation of the minimum amount of a loan Thousand $ 5 4,7 5 
Limitation of the maximum amount of a loan Thousand $ no None 200 
Loan to value ratio % 70 50 70 
Payments to income ratio % 30 30 30-40 
Money paid to an appraiser for assessment of the property 
value and issuance of an appraisal report $ 100 120 100 
Costs of real broker services and notary certification  % of housing value 6,5 1 6,5 
Annal mortgage property insurance, title risk insurance 
and borrower’s life and disability insurance payments 
% of loan amount per 
year 0,17 0,18 1,б5 
A state tax paid for the state registration of the mortgage 
agreemen $ 100 30 10 
Lower limit on the borrower's age (at the date of 
application) Full years 18 18 18 
Upper limit on the borrower's age (at the date of 
application) Full years 55 55 55 
The minimum gap in dwelling values required for 
purchase  % of ex. housing value 25 26 25 
                                                 
7 For households who are renting in the private market or who have “complex” or multigenerational families, the 
model did not allow “selling” their units.  Moscow renters of municipal housing are treated as owners since they can 
privatize their units at any time. 
 24
 
In the comparative research we focused on the effects of the interest rate and the LTV ratio on the 
share of the households who would be eligible to take loans, along with the total absorption 
capacity of the household sector.  The standard mortgage loan product described in Table 4 was 
selected. We tried to use parameters, which are close to the reality on both markets. The market 
interest rates are quite close, though in Hungary a “deep interest rate” subsidy buys down then 
effective rate to 6-7%. The selected interest rate represents a “kind of averages” to make the 
comparison possible. Defining the “value gap” we were looking for a value of the increment in 
housing value, which represent a threshold below household will not move.  
1.9 Trade-up option 
According to our model, the Moscow market has more loan capacity both in terms of the share of 
households and in terms of the total dollar amount of the loan than the Budapest market. 
 
Table 5 The total loan capacity in Budapest and Moscow: standard loan product, trade-up 
option 
 Budapest Moscow 
Share of households that can afford a loan, % 60,2 66,5 
Maximum loan capacity, mill $/1000 inhabitants 11,6 17,2 
Maximum capacity of demand for housing, mill $/1000 inhabitants 88,3 69,3 
Average loan size, thou. $ 18,6 25,8 
Average LTV ratio, % 17,4 31,2 
 
There are several reasons for the differences: 
? In Moscow the income is higher, which justifies more than a 70 percent higher loan 
capacity, 
? In Budapest the value of the existing housing stock is much higher, which results in a 
higher maximum capacity of the demand for housing 
? The difference in share is related also to the demographic structure. 
The next question was what is the demand elasticity of the interest rate and the loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio.  
The two markets react to the changes of the interest rate in a very different way. In the Budapest 
market practically there is no change in the share of households who can enter the market if we 
move from the high interest rate regime towards the low interest rate regime. In the Moscow 
market, the chance to access loans changes from 48 to 77 percent as the interest rate falls from 30 
to 3 percent.  In Budapest, in contrast, there is only about a 5 percentage point change over the 
same range.  
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Figure 6 Dependence of loan affordability on the interest rate and on LTV (trade-up 
option) 
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We find a different situation studying the effect of the changes in LTV ratio on the share of 
households who can enter the market. Loan demand on the Moscow market is not as elastic to the 
LTV ratio as the Budapest market. However, the range (difference between the maximum and 
minimum share) is less in the case of LTV than in the case of the interest rate (Figure 6). 
The reason for this is that in the case of the Budapest market 34 percent of households are not 
eligible because of their age and 9 percent of the households do not own their apartments, thus 
the share cannot increase above this limit. The other factor is the loan minimum, which can affect 
the share. At a given minimum LTV level, either the savings or the income will be the constraint. 
The model calculates the maximum possible loan for a given household based on its income and 
savings. If the market is not elastic with respect to the interest rate at a given LTV level, it means 
that the majority of the households have reached their loan maximum capacity because of the 
savings. At a given income level, a lower interest rate means a higher loan capacity; thus if loan 
demand does not increase it would mean that savings is the constraint for a majority of 
households. To study the effect of changes in the LTV, we can follow the same line of thought. 
At a given interest rate, a change in the LTV will have an effect, if savings was the constraint on 
loan capacity. Generally, the trade up option represents a situation in which the income is the 
main constraint to increased loan capacity, thus the demand will change as a function of the 
interest rate. 
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Figure 7 The effect of the interest rate on the loan characteristics (trade-up option) 
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When changing the LTV, there is very „limited room” for demand change.  For example, for the 
case of a 12 percent interest rate, savings is the „bottleneck” to increase the loan demand for only 
4,8 percent of the households; thus the change in LTV practically does not have any effect. (The 
change of the loan term has the same effect as the interest rate.) 
1.10 The first time buyer option 
For the first time buyer option, in both markets around 50 percent of the households would be 
eligible to take standard loans. Again, the relative loan demand is higher in Moscow based on the 
higher level of income. The loan to value ratio is higher in Moscow because of their lower level 
of savings. Naturally the total demand is much lower in the first time buyer option than in the 
trade up option, as the value of the existing units has been taken out from the demand.  
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Table 6 The total loan capacity in Budapest and Moscow: standard loan product, first time 
buyer option 
 Budapest Moscow 
Share of households that can afford a loan, % 52,2 50,1 
Maximum loan capacity, mill $/1000 inhabitants 9,9 15,2 
Maximum capacity of demand for housing, mill $/1000 inhabitants 22,9 27,6 
Average loan size, thou. $ 18,3 30,4 
Average LTV ratio, % 48,0 59,6 
 
In the case of the first time buyer option, the loan demand is not elastic with respect to the 
interest rate, because the savings is the main constraint on increasing household loans. At a given 
LTV level, very few households can borrow more if we change the interest rate, because their 
savings already defined the upper limit of the loan. If we go up to the maximum LTV, the 
elasticity of the loan demand depending on interestrate  decreases. (At 70 percent LTV the 
elasticity is very low.)   
 
Figure 8 Dependence of loan affordability on the interest rate and on LTV (first time buyer 
option) 
Share of household that can afford  loan (%)
0
20
40
60
80
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95
L/V ratio
%
Budapest
Moscow
Share of household that can afford  loan (%)
0
20
40
60
80
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 30
interest rate
%
Budapest
Moscow
 
 28
1.11 Issue of unequal access to mortgage 
The access to loans depends on distribution of the income and wealth („savings”) among the 
households.  
The two markets are very different. Generally the access to a loan in the first time buyer option is more 
unequal, because only the income and savings play a role in the selection and the value of the existing 
unit is not counted.  The distribution of the housing value is more equal than the income and saving 
distribution, which explains why the value of the gini index will decrease in the trade-up option. 
The value of the gini index differs in Budapest and Moscow, because the income inequalities are much 
higher in Moscow than in Budapest (Table 7).  
Table 7 unequal accesses to loan (standard loan product) 
Trade-up First time buyer 
 Budapest Moscow Budapest Moscow 
Gini index (number) 0,09 0,1 0,14 0,36 
Gini index (volume) 0,21 0,5 0,26 0,63 
Next question: how it would change with the changes of characteristics of the loan product:  
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Figure 9 Gini index of the access to loans in trade-up and first time buyer option 
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Affordability analysis 
The affordability analysis is based on the demand capacity (loan plus savings plus price of a 
home if it can be sold) to buy the “target priced” home. Several analyses (for example, Listokin, 
et al., 2002) assume that the type of “target house” relies on the household’s preferences. This 
assumption appears to be rather realistic. There are different options to set up the target prices 
based on recent mover surveys or the households’ preferences. The comparative analyses used 
only target house indicators that are common for all types of households. It was not possible to 
define the target prices for households based on their expectations8. We defined different target 
prices for the whole market and tested how many households would be able to buy these homes. 
Three options were tested: 
? Median priced house (50 % point of the housing price distribution) 
? Modestly priced house (25 % point of the housing price distribution) 
? Low price house (10 % point of the distribution). 
                                                 
8 In the Hungarian survey, special questions were asked about housing expectations, so we could define the target 
prices. Actually the respondents who indicated that in the next 5 years they want to move were asked about the type 
of housing they would seek to occupy, and even the probable price was asked. Thus, in the Hungarian chapter we 
used this data as well. 
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The target prices represent different cutting points in the distribution of the actual transactions in 
the market, not the price distribution of the stock. In this sense it is an important feature; what is 
the distance between the target prices (those for units on offer) and the actual house prices. In the 
Budapest market this is much closer than in the Moscow market, which again reflects the 
different demand elasticity of the markets. 
 
Table 8 Target prices based on the stock and on the transactions 
Moscow Budapest  
stock market stock market 
Median priced $39710 $55000 $50825 $50000 
Modestly priced $33924 $42 000 $39005 $36364 
Low priced $28617 $36 000 $29985 $29540 
 
Actual demand depends very much on the desire or intention to move.  We supposed that a 
household “will move” if the house it can buy is “better” than the existing housing unit. In the 
model, the condition that a household will move depends on whether the housing unit they can 
buy has a value at least 25 percent higher than the existing one. Twenty-five percent seems to be 
a minimum, and probably the actual market “leap” is bigger than that because of the high 
transaction cost.9 However, if we consider the renewal a kind of transaction, the 25 percent could 
be more acceptable. In the Hungarian survey 23 % of the households who wanted to change their 
housing situation planned to renew, extend their home. They need credit as well, but in their case 
the 25 % value gap is probably very close to the reality.  
The other behavioral question was the issue of household formation. In the market for existing 
units, a substantial share of transactions is connected to new households that are created when a 
part of the family will remain in the existing house and a new household will be created 
(splitters)10. In housing markets with a low level of mobility like in Hungary, the share of 
households who move together (trade-ups) could be lower (around 35-45 percent) than in a 
                                                 
9 In the reality, the relative price of the newly bought unit depends on expectation, etc. The Hungarian studies 
indicate that the price differences are higher between the new home and the home being sold to finance the purchase 
of the new one that it was supposed in the comparative analyses. In 1992 a Hungarian vacancy chain study showed 
that the difference was 68 % of the unit sold. In 2001, in a small Hungarian city the difference between the expected 
new home and the actual one was 150 % and in a recent survey of the loan application the average difference was 
100 %. (See the details in the Hungarian study.) 
10 In the case of splitters, the existing homes cannot be sold, which of course will reduce the demand capacity. 
Demand capacity is the sum of the maximum loan, the savings, and the price of the existing units). 
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market with high mobility (65-75 percent). In the comparative analysis, we will study the loan 
products and subsidies separately for trade-ups and splitters.  
1.12 Trade-up option 
In the case of the standard loan product, in both Budapest and Moscow more than 50 percent of 
households can buy the low-priced dwelling. It is interesting to note, that while loan affordability 
was more favorable to the households in Moscow, house-buying affordability is more favorable 
to the households in Budapest. This means that in Moscow 15 percent of the households are 
eligible to take loans, but they are not able to buy even the low priced units. In the case of 
Budapest only 6 percent of the households with loan affordability are not able to buy the target 
house.  
In Budapest if somebody can buy a cheap unit he can buy the median priced units. (The 
difference is less than 5 percent.) In the case of Moscow, the difference is much higher: 12 
percent of the households can buy the low-priced unit, but not the median priced. 
 
Table 9 Affordability of the trade-up option, standard loan product  (%) 
 Budapest Moscow 
Loan capacity (share of hh) 60,2 66,5 
Share of households that can buy 
Median-priced dwelling 49,3 40,4 
Modestly-priced dwelling 53,4 50,8 
Low-priced dwelling 54,1 52,4 
The question now addressed is how affordability can be influenced through the characteristics of the 
loan products. Our analysis tested the effect of changes in the interest rate and the LTV. It is important 
to note that in the analyses of the potential loan capacity we concluded that in the trade-up option 
demand is more sensitive to the interest rate changes than to LTV changes. The reason for this was that 
for the majority of households the constraint on increasing the demand was their ability to pay the debt 
service that is influenced by the interest rate.  
On the basis of the next figure, which focuses on the median price dwelling, we have very similar 
conclusions. Changing the LTV can influence the affordability of the trade-up option much less than 
changing the interest rate.   
With respect to the equity issue, there is substantial difference between the Budapest and Moscow 
housing market, which reflects the income inequality.  
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Figure 10 Effects of interest rate and LTV on affordability I. (trade-up option) 
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Figure 11 Effects of interest rate and LTV on affordability II. (trade-up option) 
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The relative size of the potential demand for mortgages is higher in Moscow, which can be 
explained by income differences. At low interest rates, the loan capacity is almost fully used. As 
the interest rate increases, the potential demand for mortgages decreases, not just in absolute 
terms, but relative to the loan capacity as well. This tendency is more present in the case of 
Budapest. 
 
Figure 12 Effects of interest rate on the potential demand for mortgages 
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The affordability analyses are very sensitive to the target prices and to the „behavioral rules”. We 
supposed that households move if they can afford a new unit more valuable than the existing one. 
However, we set the rule that the new unit should have a higher value by 25 percent, that is, if the 
“value gap” is equal to 25 percent. If we increase the value gap to 50 or 75 percent, the potential 
demand will decrease substantially.  
 
Table 10 The effects of the „value gap” on affordability (standard loan product) 
 Budapest Moscow 
 Value gap=25 %
Value 
gap=50 %
Value 
gap=75 %
Value 
gap=25 % 
Value 
gap=50 % 
Value 
gap=75 %
Share of households that can afford a loan, % 60,2 60,2 60,2 65.9 65.9 65.9 
Share of households that can buy dwelling, % 
Median-priced 47,0 21,5 7,0 35.4 27.9 21.5 
Modestly-priced dwelling 51,4 23,0 7,4 45.4 31.0 22.5 
Low-priced 52,2 23,6 7,9 47.3 31.1 22.5 
 
With a value gap of 50 percent, half of the households who were able to buy a dwelling with a 
loan, saving and using their assets accumulated in the existing unit can purchase a unit, with a 
price 50 percent higher than the existing unit. With a 75 percent value gap, the effect is more 
dramatic, only 8 percent of the households can afford the target price. The actual price of the 
target home will be higher than the median price in 87 percent of the cases.  
 
1.13 First time buyer options 
With the first time buyer option, the interpretation of the affordability figures is clearer than for 
the trade-up option. The ratio of households who can buy median priced dwellings is very close 
to the affordability indexes used in the international experiences. We examined what share of the 
households can afford to buy different target priced units. The difference from the international 
analyses is that we used a mortgage model to estimate the buying capacity.11 
                                                 
11 The index uses the median household income, 80 percent LTV ratio, and 30 percent payment value ratio. 
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Table 11 Affordability first time buyer option, standard loan product (%) 
 Budapest Moscow 
Loan capacity (share of hh) 52,2 50,1 
Share of household that can buy 
Median-priced dwelling 11,7 15,1 
Modestly-priced dwelling 20,4 19,0 
Low-priced dwelling 26,2 22,9 
 
In Budapest 26,2 percent of the households can buy low-priced units, in Moscow 22,9 percent. 
The affordability here is very sensitive to the target price. In the case of the median priced unit 
the affordability is much lower, and more so in Budapest than in Moscow. Thus, in the case of 
first time buyers, only 11,7 percent of the households can buy median priced units in Budapest, 
and 15,1 percent in Moscow. 
The first time affordability is more sensitive to the change in LTV than to the interest rate. This is 
shown in the figure 13-14. 
 
Figure 13 Effects of interest rate and LTV on affordability I. (first time buyer option) 
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Figure 14 Effects of interest rate and LTV on affordability II. (first time buyer option) 
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Effects of the subsidy programs 
In the last phase of the research we examined the possible effect of the three subsidy schemes 
shown in Table 12 on housing affordability. The first one is an interest rate subsidy (buy down in 
Cell A), which is very similar to the present Hungarian model, where the effective interest rate is 
decreased by a constant rate (9 % in Hungary). 12 
 
Table 12 Types of subsidy programs tested 
 Interest rate subsidy Upfront cash subsidy 
Flat interest rate subsidy no 
income or household criteria 
A: flat 9 % interest rate subsidy, 
only constraint is the maximum 
amount of the loan 
 
Income criteria B: Interest rate subsidy, where the 
subsidy (rate reduction) is defined 
by as a function of per capita 
income13  
C: Upfront cash subsidy equal 
to the present value of the 
subsidy given under the B 
scheme  
 
We examined the subsidy impact only for households with the trade-up option, because the 
affordability and housing demand are not sensitive to the changes in interest rates in the case of 
first time buyers.  
The programs have different effects on the affordability depending on the structure of the market. 
The effect of the Subsidy program A is basically the same as the effect of the interest rate 
decrease from 15 % to 6 %. As a consequence, the share of households that could afford to buy 
the target dwelling increases by 5,1 percentage points (in Budapest), and 10,9 percentage points 
(in Moscow). This increases housing demand by 10,5 bln USD in Budapest and 40,2 bln USD in 
Moscow.  
 
                                                 
12 The market mortgage interest rate was 15 percent in both markets (2003 summer). 
 
13 The upper income group (30 % of the households) are excluded from the subsidy. Households 
belonging to the lower 70 percent in the income distribution are entitled to a subsidy between the range of 
9% and 1 % proportional to their income.  
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Table 13 The effect of alternative subsidy programs on affordability, Budapest (trade-up option) 
Change from baseline 
 
Baseline 
Subsidy A Subsidy B Subsidy C 
Share of households that can buy dwelling, % 52,2 5,1 2,0 3,1 
Target price 
Median-priced house 47,0 6,6 2,2 3,4 
Modestly-priced house 4,4 -1,1 -0,3 -0,3 
Low-priced house 0,9 -0,4 0,1 0,1 
Demand analyze 
Potential demand for houses, bln. $ 59,9 10,5 2,4 3,8 
Potential demand for mortgages, bln. $ 10,1 7,4 1,2 0,3 
Potential demand for subsidies, bln. $ (PV 0,0 9,8 1,4 1,4 
Subsidy_equity 
Share of hh receiving subsidy, % of hh can buy house  100,0 60,8 60,6 
In the Subsidy B program the total present value of the subsidy is much less, because the rich 
households are excluded and only households belonging to the lowest income group are eligible 
for the “deep” subsidy.  Thus, only 60,8 percent (in Budapest), and 53,5 percent (in Moscow) are 
eligible for the subsidy.  The Subsidy B program is more efficient because it increases 
affordability relative to the present value of the subsidy. With a subsidy of only 13-15 % of that 
of the Subsidy Program A, the increase in affordability (to compare to the baseline version) is 
more than half of the Subsidy A’s effect. The Subsidy Program C seems to be even more 
efficient. 
 
Table 14 The effect of alternative subsidy programs on affordability, Moscow (trade-up option) 
 Baseline Subsidy A Subsidy B Subsidy C 
Share of households that can buy dwelling, % 52,4 10,9 8,7 10,7 
Target price 
Median-priced house 40,4 8,9 5,7 7,5 
Modestly-priced house 10,4 1,7 2,5 3,1 
Low-priced house 1,6 0,3 0,4 0,2 
Demand analyse 
Potential demand for houses, bln. $ 137,8 40,2 15,6 19,7 
Potential demand for mortgages, bln. $ 44,9 28,9 5,1 2,3 
Potential demand for subsidies, bln. $ (PV)  30,9 3,6 3,8 
Subsidy_equity 
Share of hh receiving subsidy, % of hh can buy house  100,0 53,5 55,0 
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We can measure the relative efficiency through an indicator, which compares the result of the 
subsidy program to the present value of the costs. Both in Budapest and in Moscow, the subsidy 
Program C is the most efficient, the next one is the Subsidy Program B and the last one is the 
Subsidy Program A.  
The simple reason why the Subsidy program B is more efficient than program A is that it gives 
more help to households who are in need (lower income and savings), and does not give subsidy 
to the households who have already reached their loan capacity. The issue here is what are the 
constraints to increased affordability. Program A and Program B can not help the households who 
are facing “downpayment-constraints”. Here Program C becomes more efficient, because it will 
give cash subsidy to the households with low savings.  
Program A increased the affordability by 7 percentage points for the share of households who can 
afford median priced units increased--from 47 % to 54 % in Budapest. In Moscow, the effect of 
Program A is more significant as it increased the share of the households who can afford the 
median priced unit from 40 % to 49 %. In Budapest, Program B, however, is more efficient: the 
share of households who can afford median-priced houses would increase more than twice than 
in Program A. In Program C the difference is four times. In Moscow, the efficiency gap is bigger 
among the programs, because Program A is very inefficient. The reason for this is the huge 
income inequalities in Moscow.  (See Figure 5.) 
If we measure the effects of the programs on the demand for housing and for loans, we have 
basically the same conclusion. However, there is an important difference: Program C increases 
housing demand more than Program A or Program B, but less the demand for loans. This is 
because the subsidy is an upfront subsidy. In the Hungarian political discussion, the bank lobby 
was much more interested in the interest rate subsidy than in moving towards a cash-based 
subsidy. Their argument was that housing demand would change as interest rates go down, but 
they did not take into consideration the lack of savings as the main constraint on increasing loans.   
 
Figure 15 The effects of the subsidy programs on the demand for housing and loans (as 
relative to 100 USD subsidy) 
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The equity issue is very important as well. Programs B and C have the same effect, because they 
are means-tested schemes. The difference is huge between their effects and those of Program A, 
but even Program C will not result in a progressive distribution of the subsidy. In the case of 
Budapest, as a consequence of means testing the subsidy, the first three income quintiles have the 
same chance to get the subsidy; and there is no difference between them. We could expect that 
lower income groups will have more subsidies according to the program rules. But this is not the 
case because among the low-income groups the share of households who cannot afford the 
median priced house – even with the subsidy – is higher than among the higher income groups. 
The households belonging to the fourth quintile have less chance than the first three, and the fifth 
is out because of the means testing. In Moscow, among the first three income quintiles the 
difference remained regressive (the higher the income, the greater the subsidy). 
 
Figure 16 Allocation of the subsidies among the income quintiles 
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Conclusion: housing policy recommendation 
This analysis explores the potential effects of mortgage characteristics on potential housing and 
loan demand. The research has produced insights into the problems housing policy makers face 
when they want to increase the role of the mortgage system. However, the analysis did not aim to 
“forecast” the actual housing market impact of alternative policies. One would need a dynamic 
model for that, while ours is basically stationary and designed for analytical purposes.  
Consequently, for example, we will not know the supply side effect of the housing units “sold” 
on the market as a result of the new mortgage products. It is clear that the increased demand for 
housing will result in an increase in the volume of trade-ups involving existing units. The 
question is what will be the price effect of this demand.  It depends on several factors we could 
not and did not want to include in the model.  
The policy advice based on our research on the superior way to support long-term borrowing is to 
select Program C.  The Hungarian subsidy program (Program A) gave a 9 % (flat) interest rate 
subsidy, which helped the trade-ups and first time buyers (with high family savings). Moreover, it 
gave incentives for household with savings to invest in housing without real housing needs; the 
program also risked producing substantial house price increases, which would worsen the 
affordability for the majority of the population.  Program B would have had better results in terms 
of the equity issue, but from an efficiency perspective, Program C is better in these two diverse 
housing markets.  
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